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Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and
Eﬃciency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and
the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home,
ﬁrms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can
reﬁnance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing ﬁrms’ eﬀective
ﬁnancing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources ineﬃciently as
they then save on ﬁnancing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital ade-
quacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on ﬁnancing
costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
Keywords: ﬁnancial contracting; multinational corporations; internal capital
markets.
JEL-Codes: G21, F23, G28
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag wird ein Bankenmodell entwickelt, um die Wechselbeziehun-
gen zwischen Unternehmensauslandsinvestitionen und der Kapitalstruktur der ﬁ-
nanzierenden Banken zu untersuchen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Multinationale Un-
ternehmen einen Anreiz haben, ineﬃzient zu investieren, um Finanzierungskosten
einzusparen. Der Grund ist, dass eine h¨ ohere Depositenreﬁnanzierung der Bank zwar
die Finanzierungskosten senkt, jedoch das Unternehmen dazu zwingt, vornehm-
lich im Heimatland zu investieren. Es zeigt sich, dass eine Regulierung des
Bankkapitals diese Ineﬃzienzen eliminiert, da durch sie eine Untergrenze f¨ ur die
Finanzierungskosten gesetzt wird. Allerdings stellen sich die neuen Baseler Regeln
als unzureichend heraus, um dieses Potential auszusch¨ opfen.
Schlagw¨ orter: Finanzvertr¨ age; Multinationale Unternehmen; Interne Kapi-
talm¨ arkte.
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Minimum requirements for bank capital is one of the most important elements of
banking regulation. By inﬂuencing lending decisions of banks, the Basel II frame-
work mainly strives for further strengthening the stability and eﬃciency of the global
ﬁnancial system. But regulating bank capital may not only aﬀect the international
allocation of funds channeled through the banking system. Instead it may also in-
ﬂuence the capital budgeting process within the borrowing companies and thereby
aﬀect the allocative eﬃciency of corporate investment. Our paper addresses this
issue. In particular, we raise the following questions. First, what role do bank loan
contracts have for allocating resources across the borrowing ﬁrms’ diﬀerent lines
of business? Second, what are the eﬀects of bank capital regulation on bank loan
contracts? And ﬁnally, does Basel II account for potential interrelations between
eﬃciency of ﬁrm-internal capital budgeting, loan contracting and capital regulation?
We analyze these questions within the Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) approach to
ﬁnancial intermediation. There, banks emerge because they help to mitigate prob-
lems associated with borrowers’ opportunistic behavior when ﬁnancial contracts are
incomplete. Banks, when acting as relationship lenders, can do so owing to their
ability to collect a debt more eﬀectively. As the major concern of ﬁnanciers, e.g.
bond holders and banks, is that resources will be allocated such that they are of
high value to them in the case of default, the value added by banks is to control
the capital budgeting within multidivisional ﬁrms. This is of particular importance
when borrowing ﬁrms oversee several divisions that diﬀer with respect to their val-
ues to ﬁnanciers, i.e. the respective assets’ tangibility.1 While this type of diversity
may apply to many multidivisional companies, an important source of it is global
diversiﬁcation. MNCs often operate in countries with diﬀerent jurisdictions, regula-
tions and other institutional factors that aﬀect the ﬁnanciers’ valuation of invested
resources. Lacking property rights, unpredictable legal decisions, or restrictive labor
market regulations, for example, typically reduce this value. Hence, ﬁnanciers’ op-
portunities to collect much in the event of a default may be limited for institutional
reasons in some countries, while they are not in other countries.
Controlling the ﬁrm-internal resource allocation by a banker has the following impli-
cations. The more resources are put to where they are of their highest value to the
banker, the less risky the loan will be for the banker. This lowers the banker’s need
to issue bank capital in order to protect herself against credit default risks, or, to put
it diﬀerently, increases her ability to reﬁnance loans with deposits. Since borrowing
from a bank is more expensive when the loan is reﬁnanced by bank capital instead by
deposits, investment in highly tangible assets lowers the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing costs. The
ﬂip side of such a bias, however, is that the MNC forgoes investment returns because
1 Evidence that asset tangibility aﬀects the willingness of lenders to provide funds and, therefore,
serves as an important determinant of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints is provided by Almeida and
Campello (2006).
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marginal returns will not be balanced across countries. We show that, while decid-
ing on the ﬁrm-internal allocation of resources across national boundaries, MNCs
have an incentive to deviate from an eﬃcient resource allocation in order to save on
ﬁnancing costs and thus on bank capital.2
The conclusion we draw is twofold. First, there is good news insofar as imposing
minimum bank capital requirements can, in principle, improve the eﬃciency of cor-
porate foreign investment. Since ﬁnancing costs depend on the capital structure of
the lending bank, regulating bank capital can be seen as an incentive device for the
borrowing ﬁrm as it eﬀectively limits the scope for reducing ﬁnancing costs at the
expense of investment eﬃciency. Second, there is also bad news as it will be shown
that the Internal-ratings based (IRB) approach of the Basel II framework is not
appropriately designed to exploit this potential. This is because in many cases, the
need for bank capital regulation to ﬁght the ﬁrms’ incentive for ineﬃcient resource
allocations increases when the probability of default decreases. Hence, if capital
standards are relaxed when the probability of default decrease, the regulator makes
bank ﬁnance too inexpensive and therefore incites an ineﬃcient resource allocation.
The insight that ﬁrm-internal allocation processes do not always work eﬃciently in
the sense that scarce resources are directed to where they are of highest productivity,
has already been pointed out. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), e.g., argue that
such ineﬃciencies arise because of power struggles among division managers. Stein
(2002) and Brusco and Panunzi (2005) point to the managers’ disincentives with
respect to information processing or to exert eﬀort. Scharfstein and Stein (2000)
and Inderst and M¨ uller (2003) identify disincentives on the part of headquarters for
allocating resources ineﬃciently. This literature, however, basically does not take
the interrelation between the lending bank’s capital structure, bank ﬁnancing and
ﬁrms’ allocation incentives into account.
A second strand of the literature closely related to our analysis is that on the interre-
lation between bank capital and lending risks. For example, Holmstr¨ om and Tirole
(1997) argued that ﬁnancial intermediaries, pledging their monitoring services to ul-
timate ﬁnanciers, need a suﬃcient stake in the success of borrowers’ projects in order
to have an incentive to reduce the probability of default. In a competitive bank-
ing sector this has been shown to translate into market-based capital requirements
for banks. Unlike their paper, we focus on the borrowers demand for monitoring
services. This perspective relates our paper to Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2006).
These authors argue that borrowers demand these services in order to commit them-
selves to behave decently and to provide suﬃcient eﬀort, while our paper deals with
the capital budgeting process within multidivisional ﬁrms. The main diﬀerence to
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2006), however, is that in their model a borrower
2 That banks play an important role in ﬁnancing FDI projects of multinational corporations is
documented by, e.g., Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002) and Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold
(2003) for the Japanese and the German case, respectively. See also Desai, Foley and Hines
(2004), who have further examined the ﬁnancing structure of MNC subsidiaries, particularly
in the light of diﬀerences in national tax systems.
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tends to not fully internalize the cost of bank capital and thus demands a too large
a capital-to-asset ratio when these costs are high. In our approach, the borrower
fully internalizes the cost of capital but we will show that he ascribes too much
weight to ﬁnancing costs from the perspective of allocative eﬃciency.
Another related literature is on the assessment of the new Basel rules and how to
improve them. For example, Repullo and Suarez (2004) have proposed a net interest
income correction for capital requirements on the basis of the Internal ratings-based
approach as its charges are too high, especially for high risk loans. Pennacchi (2005)
further suggests that procyclicality of bank lending under the new Basel rules can be
mitigated when risk-based deposit insurance systems were introduced. Rime (2005)
argues that the eﬀective choice between the Standardized and the IRB approach
may induce banks to specialize on speciﬁc loan risks, with those banks using the
Standardized approach taking too much risk and thus jeopardizing the stability
of the banking system (see also Repullo 2004). Our paper adds to this literature
by pointing out that higher default probabilities should not necessarily induce the
regulator to tighten capital adequacy requirements.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic setup of a
model of ﬁnancial intermediation and corporate foreign investment. In section 3 we
analyze the interrelation between bank loan contracts and bank capital structure.
In section 4 we derive the loan contract that will be chosen in equilibrium by MNCs
in absence of bank capital regulation. Section 5 shows that these contracts will lead
to allocative ineﬃciencies and how a regulator can improve on it. In section 6 we
critically assess the Basel II framework in the light of our results. The ﬁnal section
gives a brief summary.
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2 The basic model
Foreign direct investment projects are long-term decisions of ﬁrms. Although those
projects may generate some returns in the medium run, interim returns generally
do not suﬃce to repay the initial outlay. Instead, they have to be used for ﬁnancing
follow-up investments, which are necessary for realizing the projects’ potential long-
term returns on investment. The model below captures this general idea of corporate
foreign investment.
2.1 Technology
We consider an internationally operating entrepreneur who owns two plants. The
ﬁrst is located in the entrepreneur’s home country while the second is a foreign plant.
At date t = 0, he (the entrepreneur) can invest 1 EUR into a long-term production
technology that comprises two stages (ﬁgure 1). In the ﬁrst stage (between dates
t = 0 and t = 1), he has to transform the ﬁnancial investment into one unit of an
intermediate (physical investment) good. This good is speciﬁc to the entrepreneur’s
technology. It has thus no value except for company-internal reinvestment at t = 1
in the production of a ﬁnal good, which takes place in the second stage (between




1 unit abroad I
home (1 – I) R(1 - I)
R(I)
reinvestment at t = 1 investment at t = 0 cashflows at t = 2
Figure 1: Investments and cashﬂows
Reinvestment of the intermediate good at t = 1 may take place at home as well
as abroad. Let I denote the quantity of the intermediate good that goes to the
foreign plant. When everything is doing well during the second stage of production,
the cashﬂows of projects, due at t = 2, are given by R(1 − I) at home and by
R(I) abroad, where R is a strictly increasing and concave function with R′(0) = ∞.
Eﬃcient reinvestment is therefore given by I = 1
2.
2.2 Speciﬁcity of human capital
In order to be a success, producing the ﬁnal good not only requires the interme-
diate good. In addition, the entrepreneur’s speciﬁc skills are also needed. This
is because he is the only agent who knows how to appropriately adjust, e.g., the
production process or even the characteristics of the ﬁnal good when market con-
ditions change. Although those changes are, given the overall length of production,
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not fully unexpected, it is not possible to identify a proper adjustment policy ex
ante. Consequently, the projects cannot generate their potential returns without
the entrepreneur’s skills in the second stage of production.
Without employing the entrepreneur’s speciﬁc knowledge the only way to ﬁnalize
production is to withdraw the entrepreneur and to replace him by someone else.
Such a substitute will necessarily possess less speciﬁc skills because this agent has
not accompanied the project right from the beginning and is thus less familiar with
the markets or with the technology or both.
In our model, there are two dimensions of human capital speciﬁcity. The ﬁrst
dimension stems from the multinational nature of the ﬁrm. Owing to a substitute’s
lack of knowledge of local peculiarities he cannot run a global enterprise as eﬀectively
as the initial entrepreneur could. More precisely, while the substitute possibly runs
the home business quite well, he faces some diﬃculties in ﬁnishing the project in the
other country, where those diﬃculties are mainly due to country-related institutions.
For example, the substitute may have to incur additional expenses abroad to learn
where and how to get an oﬃcial license needed for restructuring the production
appropriately. In short, project returns tend to be lower abroad than at home when
the substitute ﬁnishes the second stage of production.
The second dimension is taken from Diamond and Rajan (2000). It states that a
substitute is less skilled in appropriately ﬁne-tuning the production process in ac-
cordance with changing market conditions. The reason here lies, e.g., in the lacking
intimacy with consumer needs or with possibilities to reﬁne the technology. As re-
gards market conditions, there are two possible states of nature. With probability
p, the state s is good, s = g, in the sense that market conditions are relatively
easy to handle. Then, the substitute can generate moderate project returns so that
the degree of speciﬁcity of the original entrepreneur’s human capital is low. With
probability 1 − p, the state is bad, s = b, and the substitute faces severe problems
in adjusting production to market conditions. Without the help of the initial en-
trepreneur, returns from the projects are therefore considerably low in the bad state
implying that his human capital is highly speciﬁc in this state. To sum up, the
returns achievable by a substitute are risky and depend on the state of nature.3
We formalize this general idea of speciﬁcity of human capital in the following way.
Shortly before date t = 1, at which the intermediate good is actually reinvested,
nature reveals its state s and the degree of speciﬁcity of human capital materializes.
In state s = g, speciﬁcity turns out to be low so that the substitute can generate
relatively high returns of βg(1 − Ig) at home and µβgIg abroad, where µ < 1 is a
measure of country-related speciﬁcity of the entrepreneur’s human capital. In state
s = b, speciﬁcity is high and returns will be only βb(1 − Ib) and µβbIb respectively
where 2βb < βg, i.e. the speciﬁcity of market-related human capital exhibits signiﬁ-
cant risk. Abusing terminology slightly, we will henceforth refer to the total returns
3 The view that the value of a ﬁrm’s assets to outsiders ﬂuctuates and is therefore risky to them
can also be found in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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realizable by a substitute as liquidation value of assets Ψs (Is), which in state s is
given by
Ψs (Is) := βs (1 − Is) + µβsIs. (1)
Two things should be emphasized here as they will turn out to be crucial for our
results. First, the presence of country-related speciﬁcity implies that the liquidation
value depends on the allocation at t = 1, with the liquidation value being lower, the
more has been directed to the foreign plant. Second, the riskiness of market-related
speciﬁcity implies that the value of assets to ﬁnanciers is risky.
2.3 Contracting
If the entrepreneur does not possess suﬃcient funds W on his own, he needs exter-
nal ﬁnancing in order to start production. The funds needed can be provided by
ﬁnanciers either directly or indirectly via a bank. Since all variables and the state
of nature are assumed to be observable but not veriﬁable, loan contracts can only
specify a non-contingent repayment obligations H of the entrepreneur. There are,
however, two further frictions that hamper ﬁnancial contracting
Inspired by Hart and Moore (1994), we assume that the entrepreneur cannot com-
mit himself to contribute his speciﬁc skills in the second stage of production, which
are needed to convert the intermediate good into the ﬁnal product. After the inter-
mediate good has been reinvested, the entrepreneur may thus threaten to quit and
to withdraw his human capital. As in Diamond and Rajan (2000) and in Hart and
Moore (1994), we consider a situation where the entrepreneur has full bargaining
power vis-a-vis an external ﬁnancier at any date. Therefore, the entrepreneur can
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer regarding an alternative repayment so that, for a
given allocation Is, repayments actually made at t = 2 are bounded by the total
liquidation value of assets Ψs (Is). His repayment is thus given by min{H,Ψs (Is)}.
The problem of external ﬁnanciers’ dependency on the borrowing ﬁrm’s overall liq-
uidation value is aggravated by another imperfection. If ﬁnanciers provide funds
directly, they are hardly able to control the actual allocation of the intermediate
good across the company’s subsidiaries at t = 1. This is an issue because the
country-related speciﬁcity of human capital implies that the liquidation value of
projects and thus the actual repayment of the entrepreneur depends on the allo-
cation at t = 1. The entrepreneur then has an incentive to invest relatively more
abroad where ﬁnanciers would collect only little by liquidating assets. The reason
is that, from the entrepreneur’s perspective, this strategy improves his bargaining
position for renegotiations at t = 2 by restraining ﬁnanciers to some extent from
liquidating assets in case he defaults.
The speciﬁcity of human capital together with the entrepreneur’s incentive to in-
vest strategically biased implies that only a few entrepreneurs have access to direct
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ﬁnancing.4 There is, however, a way out at least for some of those who cannot raise
funds directly. To wit, an entrepreneur can commit himself not to reinvest strategi-
cally when he opts for a bank loan. The banker possesses a monitoring technology
that allows to gather veriﬁable information about the allocation of the intermediate
good. Hence, the entrepreneur and the banker can agree at t = 0 on some foreign
investment I∗ with I∗ ≤ 1 and she (the banker) can ensure that the entrepreneur
indeed does exactly transfer I∗ across borders.
However, the terms of the loan contract, i.e. foreign investments I∗ and the repay-
ment obligation H∗, can be renegotiated already at t = 1 when parties have learned
the state of nature. The entrepreneur then can make a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer to
repay ˜ H instead of H∗ to the banker and to invest according to some proﬁle ˜ I. As
the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, the banker can either agree to replace
the initial contract by the new oﬀer, so that the entrepreneur invests according to
˜ I, or she can reject the oﬀer, in which case the initial contract remains in place and
the entrepreneur invests I∗ abroad.5
Finally, since all agents are risk-neutral, ﬁnanciers are willing to bridge the en-
trepreneur’s ﬁnancial gap only if payments they expect to receive cover the oppor-
tunity costs of funding. We assume that proﬁtable investment projects are scarce so
that ﬁnanciers compete for investment opportunities. Given that the net return on
alternative investments is zero, ﬁnanciers (including the banker) thus simply require
to get back what they have invested.
4 We derive the exact condition for the availability of direct ﬁnancing in section 5.2.
5 As we shall see, this bargaining structure neither excludes oﬀers to direct more resources to
the foreign plant than originally agreed upon, i.e. ˜ I > I∗, nor that such oﬀers will necessarily
be rejected in equilibrium.
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3 Bank ﬁnance
In the preceding section, we motivated banks as potentially helpful institutions to
overcome the described incentive problems. In this section, we investigate the un-
derlying principles of bank ﬁnance in two steps. First, we investigate the allocation
decision of the entrepreneur at t = 1 resulting from renegotiations with the banker.
Second, we discuss the banker’s reﬁnancing opportunities.
3.1 Renegotiations and resource allocation
As outlined above, the allocation of the intermediate good across domestic and
foreign plants is determined by renegotiations between the entrepreneur and the
banker at t = 1, when the entrepreneur oﬀers to repay ˜ H and to invest ˜ I abroad after
he and the banker have learned the state of nature. The initial loan contract then
merely serves to deﬁne the scene on which renegotiations take place. If the banker
accepts the new oﬀer, the entrepreneur will repay min{ ˜ H,Ψs(˜ I)} to the banker at
t = 2. If, however, the banker rejects the oﬀer, the initial contract remains in place,
foreign investment is I∗, and the entrepreneur will repay min{H∗,Ψs (I∗)} at t = 2.
Consequently, the banker accepts an oﬀer of the entrepreneur if and only if
min{ ˜ H,Ψs(˜ I)} ≥ min{H
∗,Ψs (I
∗)} (2)
holds true. As the banker can insist on the initial contract, (2) implies that there
is both, a lower bound for acceptable new repayment oﬀers ˜ H and an upper bound
for acceptable new foreign investment oﬀers ˜ I.
In renegotiations, the entrepreneur makes an oﬀer that maximizes his proﬁts, i.e.
max
˜ H,˜ I






The resulting investment pattern at t = 1 and the actual repayment of the en-
trepreneur at t = 2 are thus given by
Lemma 1 A loan contract with I∗ and H∗ implies that the entrepreneur allocates











and oﬀers a repayment such that the banker will get min{H∗,Ψs (I∗)} at t = 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
12 IWH-Diskussionspapiere 4/2007IWH
Lemma 1 reﬂects the principle that the banker always gets the same amount repaid
from the entrepreneur as under the initial loan contract. This principle translates
to the entrepreneur being forced either to fully meet his initial repayment obligation
H∗, or to invest no more than I∗ abroad. When the initially agreed upon foreign
investment I∗ and the repayment obligation H∗ are small enough to ensure that the
entrepreneur does not default, Ψs (I∗) ≥ H∗, the banker will insist on full repayment
of H∗. As regards investment, she is willing to make concessions, i.e. she allows the
entrepreneur to invest more than I∗ abroad as long as this does not reduce his
repayment. When Ψs (I∗) < H∗ holds true, default of the entrepreneur cannot be
avoided even by enforcing the initial contract. In this case, the banker will not
accept any foreign investment beyond I∗ as this would further decrease what she
can collect at t = 2.
Total project returns at t = 2 are higher, the more symmetric the entrepreneur’s
reinvestment is at t = 1, i.e. the closer is Is to 1
2. Therefore, he will allocate exactly
half of the intermediate good abroad, Is = 1
2, as long as the banker accepts this.
Otherwise, the entrepreneur will invest the maximum quantity of the intermediate
good abroad that is acceptable for the banker. The degree of investment symmetry
is thus higher, the lower the repayment obligation H∗ is and the higher is I∗, since
the banker then is more willing to make concessions concerning investment. The
same is true when the state of the world is good. Then, the liquidation value of
projects is relatively high so that default of the entrepreneur is less likely, implying
more leeway to renegotiate the investment pattern. Consequently, the good state
tends to be associated with both, higher repayments of the entrepreneur and more
symmetric investments than the bad state.6
3.2 Bank capital structure and ﬁnancing costs
Thus far, we have only been concerned with the asset side of the bank’s balance
sheet. We next analyze its capital structure, which will turn out to be important
for the entrepreneur’s ﬁnancing costs.
The banker is the only agent who can monitor the entrepreneur. Hence, she might
hold her ﬁnanciers up by threatening to withdraw her monitoring skills once the
initial investment is sunk. Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) have shown that de-
mandable deposits serve as a commitment device for a banker. Deposits are payable
on demand according to a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served principle. This creates a collective
action problem among depositors such that any attempt of the banker to renegotiate
the face value D of deposits will result in a bank run. The threat of a run eﬀectively
deters the banker from ever renegotiating with depositors, as a run would ultimately
exclude the banker from access to her assets.
6 Desai (2007) provides anecdotal evidence for MNCs renegotiating the terms of a loan, in
particular amendments such as new capital expenditures and other asset acquisitions, in times
when credit markets have gained strength.
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The downside of deposits is, however, that they cannot be renegotiated even in bad
times, i.e. when the banker collects less from the entrepreneur than what she owes
to depositors. Then, a bank run is inevitable. Given that a run deﬁnitely excludes
a banker for all times from carrying on banking, the banker is unwilling to agree
on any contractual arrangement that is associated with a positive probability of a
bank run.7 Since avoiding runs for all states can only be achieved when deposits
are limited to what the banker can repay in the worst state, their face value D is
restricted to Dmax := min{H∗,Ψb (I∗)}, which according to lemma 1 is the minimum
repayment of the entrepreneur to the banker.
The banker can also issue capital (equity shares) to reﬁnance loans. Bank capital is
not subject to a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served principle. In bad times, i.e. when borrowers
default on their debt, capital therefore allows the banker to share her loan losses
with capital holders without being exposed to a run. Hence, issuance of bank capital
can be a reasonable way of reﬁnancing loans since market-related risks to human
capital speciﬁcity may translate into credit default risks. The downside of capital is
that in good times, when borrowers fully meet their debt services, the banker can
divert some of her loan earnings as personal rents by holding up capital holders. We
will not explicitly model the interaction between capital holders and the banker, but
assume, consistently with Diamond and Rajan (2000), that the former get only half
of the banker’s loan earnings net of deposits and that the banker diverts the other
half. At t = 2, the entrepreneur will thus pay min{H∗,Ψs (I∗)} to the banker, of
which depositors will receive D while the remainder will be equally split between
shareholders and the banker.
The setting for the analysis of the banker’s reﬁnancing opportunities is herewith
established. As the banker is assumed to possess no funds on her own, she has
to borrow a total of 1 − W from her ﬁnanciers. Given a zero net return on the
alternative investment, borrowing is possible only if depositors and shareholders
can expect to get a repayment of at least 1 − W. The participation constraint of

















Since expected repayments of the entrepreneur, that is his ﬁnancing costs, are




∗) − 2(1 − W) + D ≥ 0. (6)
The volume D of deposits thus establishes a lower bound on ﬁnancing costs. In-
tuitively, the more the bank is ﬁnanced by deposits, the cheaper the loan to the
entrepreneur can be. Every additional Euro of deposits makes one Euro of capital
plus one Euro of banker’s rents redundant so that minimum ﬁnancing costs decrease
by one Euro.
7 See Diamond and Rajan (2000) for an in depth analysis of a banker’s choice between safe and
risky deposit contracts.
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Based hereon and the aforementioned upper bound Dmax for deposits, we can already
shed light on the basic tradeoﬀ the entrepreneur faces. The more he is allowed to
reinvest abroad, i.e. the higher is I∗, the less he will repay to the banker in the
bad state. This in turn lowers the maximum volume of deposits Dmax so that the
banker has to issue more bank capital and minimum ﬁnancing costs increase. The
entrepreneur may thus be inclined to commit to higher reinvestments at home in
order to save on ﬁnancing costs.
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4 Equilibrium bank loan contract without bank
capital regulation
We next investigate the terms of the loan contract as agreed upon between the
entrepreneur and the banker at t = 0. With foreign investment I∗ and the repayment
obligation H∗, the contract has two dimensions. A reasonable way is thus to proceed
in two steps. First, we identify the optimum H∗ for some given contractual allocation
I∗, and discuss the resulting ﬁnancing costs and actual resource allocation. Second,
we determine that I∗, which ﬁnally maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected proﬁts,
and analyze the implied investment eﬃciency.
4.1 Contractual repayment obligations
For a given I∗, the entrepreneur seeks to minimize the repayment obligation H∗ as
this maximizes his expected proﬁts for two reasons, both following from lemma 1.
The ﬁrst is that, in each state, a lower H∗ gives him more leeway to invest resources
eﬃciently, and more eﬃcient investment increases returns. The second reason is that
his ﬁnancing costs P (H∗,I∗) increase in H∗. Consequently, if there are repayment
obligations H∗ satisfying the participation constraint (6), the entrepreneur always
oﬀers the smallest possible one that meets this constraint. Intuitively, suppose that
the entrepreneur oﬀered H∗ = 0. Then both, expected repayments to ﬁnanciers and
deposits issued by the banker, would be zero, and condition (6) would be violated.
Therefore, the entrepreneur must raise his oﬀer H∗. One the one hand, this increases
expected repayments P (H∗,I∗) and thus eases constraint (6). On the other hand,
a higher H∗ also allows the banker to issue more deposits, and, to save on ﬁnancing
costs, the entrepreneur will force the banker to indeed maximally increase the volume
of deposits up to Dmax. After all, he thus raises H∗ until ﬁnanciers are marginally
willing to accept. For a given I∗, the proﬁt maximizing H∗, henceforth denoted by









∗)}) = 1−W. (7)
From the so deﬁned proﬁt maximizing repayment obligation and the associated
optimal volume of deposits d(I∗) = min{h(I∗),Ψb (I∗)}, we can derive the resulting
entrepreneur’s ﬁnancing costs and resource allocation:
Lemma 2 Deﬁne
Wmin (I




∗) − Ψb (I
∗)]. (8)
For a given I∗ ≤ 1, the proﬁt maximizing repayment obligation h(I∗), the associated
volume of deposits d(I∗), the implied entrepreneur’s ﬁnancing costs P (h(I∗),I∗) and
the actual resource allocation ιs(I∗) in state s have the following properties:
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3. if Wmin (I∗) > W, then the entrepreneur cannot obtain a loan with I∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma states that in order to economize on ﬁnancing costs, the entrepreneur
forces the banker to reﬁnance the loan primarily with deposits and to issue as lit-
tle bank capital as possible. There is, however, an upper bound for both deposits
and capital. Intuitively, the agreement I∗ on foreign investment deﬁnes the en-
trepreneur’s threat point for renegotiations at t = 1, which pinpoints his maximum
possible repayment for each state. The maximum repayment in the bad state,
Ψb (I∗), speciﬁes the maximum volume of deposits, while the maximum repayment
in the good state, Ψg (I∗), limits the maximum volume of additional bank capital
to
p
2 [Ψg (I∗) − Ψb (I∗)].
Based on these upper bounds, lemma 2 distinguishes three basic regions with com-
binations of contractual allocations I∗ and ﬁnancial endowments W of the en-
trepreneur establishing the borders between them. In the ﬁrst region, deﬁned by
(9), the maximum volume of deposits Ψb (I∗) suﬃces to cover the entrepreneur’s
ﬁnancing needs 1 − W completely. Consequently, he forces the banker to reﬁnance
herself by deposits only, so that she issues no bank capital. In this zero capital
region, the entrepreneur promises to repay h(I∗) = 1 − W and will always meet
this obligation. Put diﬀerently, the contractual allocation I∗ is suﬃciently small
(compared to W) to deter him from defaulting in any state. This, however, also
means that the entrepreneur can renegotiate I∗ in both states, so that his actual
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investment pattern is never restricted by I∗. With βg ≥ 2βb, this leads to symmetric
investments in the good state. Note that internal funds required for deposit-only
reﬁnanced debt are increasing in I∗. This is because a higher agreed upon foreign
investment worsens the banker’s bargaining position vis-a-vis the entrepreneur and
thus reduces her capability to issue deposits.
In the second region, deﬁned by (13), the maximum volume of deposits Ψb (I∗) falls
short of the entrepreneur’s external ﬁnancing needs 1 − W. The bank loan must
therefore be reﬁnanced in part with bank capital, giving the banker some leeway
to extract rents. The repayment obligation h(I∗) then is the sum of (i) deposits,
Ψb (I∗), (ii) the payment to bank shareholders in the good state such that they
agree to ﬁll the ﬁnancial gap, 1
p [(1 − W) − Ψb (I∗)], and (iii) the banker’s rent,
which is equal to what shareholders get. Hence, for this mixed-reﬁnancing region,
the contractual foreign investment I∗ is too large (relative to W) to allow for a
loan in which the entrepreneur credibly promises a state-independent repayment.
Instead, the entrepreneur will default in the bad state. Then, however, he cannot
renegotiate I∗ since the banker never permits to deviate from I∗ in the case of
default. Consequently, the entrepreneur is forced to invest at most I∗ abroad in the
bad state, and he will fully exploit this opportunity as long as it does not allow for
symmetric investment.
In the good state, the entrepreneur can, in principle, renegotiate foreign investment
because he is capable of complying with the promised repayment. As regards the
outcome of renegotiations, lemma 2 suggests to further divide the mixed-reﬁnancing
region into two subregions. The ﬁrst subregion is where the initial endowment W
of the entrepreneur is relatively high compared to I∗, such that (13) and














are both met. Here, the entrepreneur’s need for external ﬁnancing and thus his
repayment obligation is suﬃciently small to let the banker accept symmetric invest-
ment in the good state. This subregion will henceforth be labeled as the good state
symmetry subregion. The second subregion is where the initial endowment of the
entrepreneur is relatively small, i.e. where (13) holds while (19) is not met. Then,
his repayment obligation h(I∗) is too high to allow for symmetric investment in the
good state. Consequently, in this good state asymmetry subregion, the entrepreneur
invests the maximum amount abroad which marginally allows him to repay h(I∗).
Note that an entrepreneur with the smallest possible endowment Wmin (I∗), as de-
ﬁned in (8), can no longer renegotiate I∗ in the good state, but must invest according
to I∗ in any state. As deposits are restricted to Ψb (I∗) and additional bank capital
is limited to
p
2 [Ψg (I∗) − Ψb (I∗)], the entrepreneur can start production only if he
is able to bridge the resulting ﬁnancial gap Wmin (I∗) with internal funds, which is
increasing in I∗ since a higher I∗ widens the scope for renegotiating repayments, as
shown above, thereby lowering the entrepreneur’s credit worthiness.
In the third region, the entrepreneurs’ endowment falls short of Wmin (I∗). Conse-
quently, their credible repayments are too small to raise a loan with I∗.
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4.2 Contractual allocation rules
The last step in characterizing the loan contract is to determine the contractual
foreign investment I∗. The preceding section has shown that in the zero capital
region ﬁnancing costs and the eﬃciency of reinvestment patterns do not depend on
I∗. Consequently, the entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between all I∗ in this region. In the
mixed-reﬁnancing region, however, the entrepreneur faces a tradeoﬀ when deciding
upon I∗. On the one hand, lowering I∗ serves as an additional commitment device to
repay loans so that the banker can issue more deposits. This reduces the ﬁnancing
costs because the entrepreneur can save on the banker’s rent by lowering the share
of the loan reﬁnanced by bank capital. Therefore, the repayment obligation of the
entrepreneur can decrease, giving him more leeway to allocate resources eﬃciently
in the good state. On the other hand, an increase in I∗ makes investment in the
bad state more eﬃcient.
Given this tradeoﬀ between lowering ﬁnancing costs and enhancing allocative eﬃ-
ciency, it never pays for the entrepreneur to conclude a contract with I∗ > 1
2 allowing
him to invest more resources abroad than at home. While an increase of I∗ beyond
1
2 does not aﬀect investment as it will then, as a result of renegotiations at t = 1, be
already symmetric in either state, it worsens the banker’s ability to issue deposits
and thus tends to raise the ﬁnancing costs of the entrepreneur. Consequently, a
contract containing I∗ > 1
2 never makes him better oﬀ than a contract with I∗ = 1
2.
We can therefore restrict attention to contracts with I∗ ≤ 1
2.
This leads to our ﬁrst main conclusion.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium contractual allocation rule I∗
eq has the following
properties:
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∗
3))] − (1 − µ)βb.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 distinguishes four groups of entrepreneurs that diﬀer with respect
to their initial ﬁnancial endowments W. The ﬁrst group comprises entrepreneurs





, who are eﬀectively too wealthy to face the above tradeoﬀ.
For them, any combination of W and I∗ ≤ 1
2 belongs to the zero capital region.
Therefore, they commit to always repay 1−W and thus minimize ﬁnancing costs by
demanding a loan that is completely reﬁnanced by deposits. Besides, they choose a
contractual foreign investment I∗ = 1
2, which allows them to invest symmetrically
and thus eﬃciently in each state.

























second group. They face the aforementioned tradeoﬀ between investing eﬃciently
and minimizing ﬁnancing costs. An entrepreneur in this group could ensure sym-
metric investment by setting I∗ = 1
2. He will not do so, however, since this would
require reﬁnancing the loan by both, deposits and capital. Instead, the entrepreneur
lowers I∗ either until he reaches I∗
2, where the zero capital region begins, so that a
further decrease of ﬁnancing costs is no longer feasible, or until he reaches I∗
3, where
marginal beneﬁts from reducing ﬁnancing costs equal the marginal costs of ineﬃcient
investments. As regards the latter, only bad state investments are relevant for him
since in this group entrepreneurs are suﬃciently wealthy to invest symmetrically in
the good state anyway.



















> W ≥ 1 − Ψb (0) −
p
2 [Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)]. In principle, en-
trepreneurs in this group are confronted with the same tradeoﬀ as the second group.
As their endowment is even smaller, however, they cannot conclude a loan with
I∗ = 1




1 is deﬁned by (23). Hence, when I∗
1 is stipulated, the loan is reﬁ-
nanced partly by bank capital, and implies that foreign investment is I∗
1 regardless of
the state. By further lowering I∗ below I∗
1, entrepreneurs in this third group cannot
only lower their ﬁnancing costs as it was the case for the second group. Instead, they
can also use the additional leeway they obtain for more symmetric investment in
the good state until either the marginal beneﬁts and costs of reduction are equal, or
the zero capital region is reached. But for the poorest entrepreneurs in this group,
it can be even the case that the beneﬁts from reducing I∗ never outweigh the loss of
investment symmetry in the bad state so that they stipulate I∗
1 in the loan contract.
Entrepreneurs with an initial endowment smaller than 1−Ψb (0)−
p
2 [Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)]
are in the forth group. They are too poor to obtain a loan at all. Even if they
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committed to make no foreign investment at all, I∗ = 0, they would be unable to
credibly promise a repayment that would convince the banker’s ﬁnanciers to provide
the funds needed for investment.
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 4/2007 21IWH
5 Investment eﬃciency and minimum capital re-
quirements
In this section, we derive the next two main results of the paper. We will demonstrate
that from the perspective of a social planner, at least some entrepreneurs choose a
loan contract that leads to a too ineﬃcient investment pattern. We will also show
that imposing minimum capital requirements for banks is more appropriate than
direct ﬁnancing to cope with the problem of investment ineﬃciencies, which arise
from the tradeoﬀ between lowering ﬁnancing costs and balancing marginal returns.
5.1 Ineﬃciency of bank loan contracts
In a ﬁrst-best world, the eﬃcient investment pattern of the entrepreneur would
be to always balance marginal returns on investment irrespective of the state of
nature, i.e. to reinvest the intermediate good symmetrically. We have seen in the
preceding section, however, that some entrepreneurs can obtain a bank loan only if
they commit to invest less than half of the intermediate good abroad. For them, a
bank loan with I∗ = 1
2 implies a too small renegotiation-proof repayment to let the
ﬁnanciers be willing to lend out funds.
Given the frictions in ﬁnancial contracting associated with debt renegotiations, a
social planner can only strive for a second-best solution. The planner’s objective
is then to maximize expected total returns on investment subject to the restriction
that only a limited set of bank loan contracts is available to entrepreneurs. This
leads to our second main conclusion which characterizes the socially (second-best)
eﬃcient contractual foreign investment.
Proposition 2 Let I∗
eﬀ denote the socially (second-best) eﬃcient contractual foreign
investment.
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The proposition shows that the socially eﬃcient allocation I∗
eﬀ is never below the
third-best I∗
eq (as derived in proposition 1). For some entrepreneurs, I∗
eﬀ is even
strictly higher than I∗
eq. That is, the socially eﬃcient loan contract tends to allow
for higher investments abroad. The reason is the following. When writing ﬁnancial
contracts, entrepreneurs tend to care not only about the returns that can be realized
but also about their respective ﬁnancing costs. These costs comprise both, the initial
outlay of 1 EUR for the physical investment at t = 0 and the rents paid to the banker,
which depend on the bank’s capital structure. From a social planner’s point of view,
the latter should be irrelevant as they are only a matter of a redistribution of returns.
But, as opposed to a social planner, entrepreneurs are inclined to commit to higher
reinvestments at home in order to save on bank capital and thus on banker’s rents.






They possess plenty of internal funds so that bank capital is irrelevant to them.
Therefore, they already choose a loan with I∗ = 1
2 which allows them to always
invest symmetrically as a social planner would like them to do.
























, the social optimum is also characterized by investment sym-
metry in either state. Entrepreneurs in this group will, however, not implement this
as long as their choice of the bank loan is unrestricted. Instead, they commit them-
selves to invest less than half of the intermediate good abroad in the bad state, since
this allows them to obtain a loan with a higher share of deposits, thereby making a
smaller expected repayment to the banker.






















2 [Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)] is too poor to obtain a loan with I∗ = 1
2 so that they
cannot always invest symmetrically. Consequently, in the social optimum, project
returns in the good and in the bad state are traded oﬀ. For this group, we can
distinguish two cases. The ﬁrst is when the probability of default (PD) is relatively
high, 1 − p >
βb
βg−βb, so that a social planner is mainly interested in investment
eﬃciency in the bad state. He would then ﬁnd it optimal to incite entrepreneurs in
this group to make more symmetric investments in the bad state than in the good
state. This, however, is impossible under a bank loan contract since the contractual
foreign investment cannot be made state contingent. That is, a relatively symmetric
investment in the bad state requires a high I∗ on which the entrepreneur would
insist in the good state as well. The best that a social planner can do in this case
is to enforce the maximum feasible contractual foreign investment I∗
1, so that the
investment pattern is the same in each state. This, however, implies that marginal
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expected returns from investments in both states are not balanced. The second case
is when PD is relatively small with 1 − p ≤
βb
βg−βb. A balancing of marginal returns
then is feasible and can be implemented by choosing I∗
4.
5.2 Direct ﬁnancing






bank loan implies unnecessarily ineﬃcient investments. A remedy for this problem
could be direct ﬁnancing. In contrast to a banker, ﬁnanciers who lend directly cannot
control the resource allocation at t = 1. From the viewpoint of a social planner, this
has the advantage that the entrepreneur can always invest symmetrically, because
he is not eﬀectively restricted in his reinvestment decision. The downside of direct
ﬁnancing is, however, that unskilled ﬁnanciers have a very weak bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis the entrepreneur when he decides upon resource allocation at t = 1.
Therefore, only a limited number of entrepreneurs has access to direct ﬁnancing.
In principle, a loan provided by unskilled ﬁnanciers is identical to a bank loan with
I∗ = 1, since the entrepreneur can, at worst, threaten to allocate all resources
to the foreign plant at t = 1. It therefore follows from lemma 1 that the en-
trepreneur can at most promise to repay Ψs (1) in state s to his unskilled ﬁnanciers.
Consequently, the maximum size of a loan granted by means of direct ﬁnancing is
pΨg (1) + (1 − p)Ψb (1), so that his ﬁnancial endowment must be at least
W ≥ 1 − pΨg (1) − (1 − p)Ψb (1).
With the help of this minimum ﬁnancial endowment for obtaining a loan from un-
skilled ﬁnanciers, we investigate whether or not direct ﬁnancing can actually improve
investment eﬃciency. Recall from proposition 1 that the ﬁrst group of entrepreneurs





concludes a bank loan contract with I∗ = 1
2 that implies sym-
metric investments in either state. As long as this group is the only one having also






holds true, direct ﬁnance will not lead to more eﬃcient investment patterns. Then,
those entrepreneurs who are actually in need of direct ﬁnancing in order to improve
eﬃciency cannot raise suﬃcient funds by this instrument. If (31), however, is not
met, direct ﬁnancing is also available to at least some entrepreneurs who would,
according to proposition 1, agree on a bank loan with I∗ < 1
2. Consequently, direct
ﬁnancing improves investment eﬃciency by allowing these entrepreneurs to make
symmetric investments and they will indeed demand direct ﬁnance because this
makes them better oﬀ than a bank loan.
To conclude, direct ﬁnancing cannot generally eliminate the problem of ineﬃcient
investment, because it is not necessarily available to every entrepreneur. The extent
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to which directly placed debt mitigates the problem depends, inter alia, on µ and βb,
as can be seen from (31). First, it is less suitable, the smaller is µ since this makes
the threat to invest everything abroad more painful for ﬁnanciers, so that fewer
entrepreneurs can obtain direct ﬁnancing. Second, it is also less suitable, the higher
is βb since this allows more entrepreneurs to reﬁnance a bank loan with symmetric
investments by deposits only.
5.3 Optimal bank capital regulation
Proposition 2 has shown that the arising ineﬃciencies in ﬁnancial contracting are
basically associated with a too low level of bank capital. Imposing capital standards
for banks might therefore be a remedy for this problem. Indeed, we will show that
with minimum capital requirements a regulator can eliminate the above disincentives
in ﬁnancial contracting provided a properly designed regulation.
In order to deﬁne a bank’s capital-to-asset ratio, we need a closer look at a bank’s
balance sheet at t = 0. In accordance with accounting standards, the loan is booked
on the asset side with its face value 1 − W (which is the amount borrowed by the
entrepreneur), while liabilities consist of deposits with face value D and capital. The
book value of capital is, owing to the adding-up constraint, equal to 1 − W − D.
Hence, the capital-to-asset ratio k at t = 0 is deﬁned as
k := 1−W−D
1−W . (32)
At t = 1, after the banker and the entrepreneur have reached an agreement in
renegotiations, the banker is redundant. Then, capital standards no longer restrict
the banker for two reasons. First, she could simply sell the loan at a price equal to
what she would get from the entrepreneur at t = 2. Second, she could unlimitedly
issue further bank capital without extracting further rents because her monitoring
skills are no longer required from date t = 1 onwards.
In essence, a regulatory minimum requirement kreg on bank capital eﬀectively places
an upper bound Dreg := (1 − kreg)(1 − W) on the volume of deposits issued by the
bank at t = 0. With this instrument at hand, the regulator can restrict the set
of loan contracts available. Using this tool wisely, the regulator can even enforce
the socially (second-best) eﬃcient contract for each entrepreneur, which is our third
main conclusion.





there is an optimal
minimum capital-to-asset ratio kreg satisfying
k








The intuition for proposition 3 is the following. According to (33) and lemma 2, the
eﬃcient contractual foreign investment I∗
eﬀ is associated with a speciﬁc capital-to-
asset ratio ˜ k and with eﬀective ﬁnancing costs of (1−W)(1+˜ k). When the regulator
imposes ˜ k as a minimum requirement, the entrepreneur could in principle still put
an I∗, which is either above or below I∗
eﬀ, into the contract. He will, however, choose
none of these two options.
For any I∗ > I∗
eﬀ, the optimal contract for the entrepreneur as speciﬁed in lemma 2
is associated with a bank’s capital-to-asset ratio above ˜ k. Therefore, he would be
in no way restricted by a requirement ˜ k when agreeing on I∗ > I∗
eﬀ. But stipulating
such an I∗ is not worthwhile for the entrepreneur because proposition 1 suggests that
his expected proﬁts decrease when he increases the contractual foreign investment
beyond I∗
eﬀ. For all I∗ < I∗
eﬀ, the entrepreneur cannot conclude a contract according
to lemma 2. This is because the bank’s capital then would fall short of the minimum
requirement. Instead, the capital requirement ˜ k must be observed for all I∗ below
I∗
eﬀ so that the entrepreneur has no scope to further decrease ﬁnancing costs below
(1 − W)(1 + ˜ k). Therefore, he would prefer such contracts only if they yielded
higher expected returns on investment than the contract with I∗
eﬀ. This, however, is
not true since, by deﬁnition, I∗
eﬀ already maximizes expected returns on investment.
The entrepreneur will therefore ﬁnd it optimal to write I∗
eﬀ into the contract when
kreg = ˜ k is imposed.
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6 A critical assessment of the Basel II framework
An important property of the optimum capital-to-asset ratio is that it does not imply
a one-size-ﬁts-all policy. Instead, as laid down in proposition 3, it depends on the
respective characteristics of the borrower. From this general perspective the move
from the ﬁrst Basel accord to Basel II has to be appreciated. Yet, the new Basel
rules have some unpleasant features that actually limit their potential to enhance
eﬃciency of corporate investment.
The progress made by Basel II has often been seen in its economic approach to
evaluating credit risk. With its Standardized Approach, risk is measured on basis of
external credit assessments. With its Internal Ratings-based approach (IRB), banks
are allowed to use their internal rating systems in order to evaluate their risk. Under
the foundation IRB approach, banks basically provide their own estimates of the
loans’ probabilities of default (PD), while under the advanced IRB approach banks
also provide their estimates of the other risk components (loss given default, expo-
sure at default, maturity). The risk-weight functions, set by the Basel Committee,
then map these risk measures onto capital requirements. A main property of these
functions is that they imply higher capital requirements when PD increases.
It has been argued that these functions have come into eﬀect in order to improve
the stability and eﬃciency of the international banking system. While they may
indeed be helpful in this regard, they unfortunately limit the eﬃciency enhancing
potential of minimum capital-to-asset ratios regarding corporate foreign investment
as they are not in line with the borrowers’ incentives needed for allocating resources
eﬃciently. This is our ﬁnal main conclusion.
Proposition 4 When the probability of default (PD) decreases, the optimal mini-
mum capital-to-asset ratio ˜ k:








































1 − Ψb (0) −
p
2 [Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)] if their probability of default is not too small,
i.e. if 1 − p >
βb
βg−βb, and otherwise increases for at least some entrepreneurs.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that eﬃciency cannot be further improved for entrepreneurs
who possess suﬃcient funds to already write a contract with I∗ = 1
2. Consequently,
the optimal minimum capital-to-asset ratio ˜ k for them does not change after a
decrease of PD.
As argued above, for all other entrepreneurs symmetric investment in both states
is not achievable. For them, a fall in PD has two countervailing eﬀects on the
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respective optimal capital requirement, which a social planner has to account for.
First, when PD decreases, achieving symmetric investment in the good state gains
in importance for a social planner, while missing symmetric investment in the bad
state becomes less important. Hence, one might conjecture that a planner, striving
for maximizing expected returns, could be tempted to let the entrepreneur agree on a
lower I∗. According to lemma 2, this would allow for more symmetric investment in
the good state but comes at the expense of lost eﬃciency in the bad state. According
to proposition 3, the planner can achieve such a lower I∗ by reducing the imposed
capital-to-asset ratio.
The second eﬀect of a decreasing PD is that the entrepreneur’s repayment obli-
gation can be decreased as a full repayment of the loan becomes more likely. A
lower repayment obligation in turn gives the entrepreneur more leeway to invest
resources eﬃciently in the good state even when I∗ remains unchanged. This makes
higher contractual I∗ possible, for which allocative eﬃciency in the bad state can
be improved without completely deteriorating the scope for eﬃciency gains in the
good state. As a higher I∗ further restricts the banker’s ability to issue deposits, it
coincides with an increase in the regulatory capital-to-asset ratio.
Which of the two eﬀects dominates, strongly depends on the relative importance
of achieving eﬃciency in the bad state. When PD is already high, such that
1−p >
βb
βg−βb holds true, the second eﬀect dominates, that is, the optimal capital-to-
asset ratio will increase when PD decreases. As we have argued in proposition 2, a
high PD implies that a social planner cannot balance marginal returns from invest-
ments in both states since he cannot implement more symmetric investments in the
bad state than in the good state. Therefore, he enforces the maximum feasible con-
tractual foreign investment I∗
1 so that the entrepreneur makes the same investment
in both states. When the PD decreases in this situation, higher contractual foreign
investments I∗ become feasible, and in order to narrow the gap between expected
marginal returns, a regulator should fully exploit this additional scope by tightening
capital requirements.
But even if PD is relatively small, such that 1 − p ≤
βb
βg−βb, there will always be
at least some entrepreneurs whose optimal capital-to-asset ratio ˜ k increases when
PD falls. Consider, for example, entrepreneurs with an eﬃcient I∗ close to 1
2. They
can invest almost symmetrically in both states. For them, a decrease in PD lowers
their repayment obligation to such an extent that they are no longer kept oﬀ from
investing resources symmetrically in the good state even when I∗ remains unchanged.
Hence, the planner is given additional leeway to improve investment eﬃciency in the
bad state as well. In order to exploit it, the planner should further tighten capital
requirements such that the entrepreneur is incited to write a loan contract with
higher corporate foreign investment I∗.
To sum up, there never is a positive relation between PD and ˜ k when PD is already
large. When it is small, a positive relation holds true at best for a subset of en-
trepreneurs. In the light of these results, the Basel II framework is not a proper
instrument to cope with MNC’s incentives to invest ineﬃciently. Instead, it gives
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them more leeway to save on ﬁnancing costs when PD decreases. This may even im-
ply that the capital requirement becomes non-binding for them so that the eﬀective
capital-to-asset ratio of the bank is above the regulatory requirement.
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7 Summary
In this paper we have investigated the eﬀects of bank capital regulation on the
ﬁrm-internal allocation of resources within MNCs. Based on Diamond and Rajan
(2000), we have developed a model of ﬁnancial intermediation that allows to study
the interrelation between the ﬁrms’ decisions on corporate foreign investment, the
capital structure of their lending banks, and regulatory bank capital requirements.
The basic insight is that MNCs face a tradeoﬀ between allocative eﬃciency and
ﬁnancing costs. We have argued that the more a bank is reﬁnanced by deposits, the
lower are the MNC’s ﬁnancing costs because it then saves on costly bank capital. At
the same time, more deposits require the MNC to commit itself to allocate resources
mainly to those locations where tangibility (but not productivity) of assets is highest.
This is because more deposits can be issued only when repayments to the banker in
the case of default will be suﬃciently large.
Given this tradeoﬀ, MNCs are inclined to write loan contracts that deter them from
allocating resources eﬃciently as they can save on ﬁnancing costs in doing so. As
the latter are, however, solely a matter of redistribution, a social planner prefers to
force MNCs to choose loan contracts that allow for eﬃcient investment. For those
MNCs that have no access to direct ﬁnance, we have shown that imposing a properly
designed minimum capital-to-asset ratio for their lending banks can eliminate this
ineﬃciency completely. The argument is that with minimum capital requirements
the regulator eﬀectively puts a lower bound on MNCs’ ﬁnancing costs, thereby
restricting the set of feasible contracts to those that prevent MNCs from investing
ineﬃciently.
Against this background, the existing Basel II framework does not allow for this
eﬃciency enhancing potential of bank capital standards. The model implies that
loose capital requirements for loans to ﬁrms with lower probabilities of default are not
advisable. Instead, as a lower PD may incite MNCs even more to not take allocative
eﬃciency into account, the regulator should impose tighter capital standards for
those ﬁrms. Hence, even when the existing Basel rules eﬀectively contribute to
further strengthening the stability and eﬃciency of the international banking sector,
their overall eﬀect on eﬃciency of international capital ﬂows needs to be reappraised.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To begin with, note that the entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between making an inac-
ceptable oﬀer to the bank and oﬀering to repay H∗ and to invest I∗ abroad. Con-
sequently, we can restrict attention to acceptable oﬀers which meet ˜ H ≥ HB
s :=






. Furthermore, as the repayment
min{ ˜ H,Ψs(˜ I)} of the entrepreneur is weakly decreasing in ˜ H for a given ˜ I, the op-
timal repayment oﬀer is ˜ H = HB
s = min{H∗,Ψs (I∗)} so that the entrepreneur’s
proﬁt is:







Now, note that the restriction (2) directly implies Ψs(˜ I) ≥ min{H∗,Ψs (I∗)} so that
his proﬁt simpliﬁes to:
R(1 − ˜ I) + R(˜ I) − min{H
∗,Ψs (I
∗)} − W. (35)
The entrepreneur thus repays min{H∗,Ψs (I∗)} to the banker and, as (35) is
weakly increasing (decreasing) in ˜ I for ˜ I ≤ 1
2 (˜ I ≥ 1


































Proof of Lemma 2
If W ≥ 1 − Ψb (I∗), then (7) implies that
h(I
∗) = 1 − W ≤ Ψb (I




g = 1 − W. Consequently, the optimal volume of de-
posits is d(I∗) = HB
b = 1 − W and the expected repayment of the entrepreneur
is P (h(I∗),I∗) = pHB
g + (1 − p)HB




so that it follows from lemma 1 and βg ≥ 2βb that the entrepreneur’s investment
abroad is ιg(I∗) = 1









If 1 − Ψb (I∗) > W ≥ Wmin (I∗), then (7) implies that
h(I
∗) = Ψb (I
∗) + 2
p [(1 − W) − Ψb (I
∗)] ∈ (Ψb (I
∗),Ψg (I
∗)]. (37)
Consequently, we have HB
b = Ψb (I∗) and HB
g = h(I∗), the volume of deposits
is d(I∗) = HB
b = Ψb (I∗), and the expected repayment of the entrepreneur
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in the bad state.
If Wmin (I∗) > W, we know from (7) that no ﬁnancing is available for the en-
trepreneur.
Proof of Proposition 1
Taking his initial endowment W as given, the entrepreneur chooses I∗ (and the
associated variables as speciﬁed in lemma 2) such that his expected proﬁt
Π = p[R(1 − ιg (I
∗)) + R(ιg (I
∗))] + (1 − p)[R(1 − ιb (I





is maximized. As we have argued in lemma 2 and in the main text, we can restrict







1 is the maximum feasible contractual alloca-
tion as deﬁned in (23). We now determine the equilibrium I∗ by investigating the
ﬁrst derivative of Π with respect to I∗. We do so for two cases, depending on how
much internal funds the entrepreneur owns.













. Accordingly, it follows from (10), (11) and (12) that the expected proﬁt








the contract with I∗ = 1










> W ≥ 1−Ψb (0)−
p
2 (Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)). In this







, and the ﬁrst derivative of the entrepreneur’s






















0 if I∗ ≤ I∗


























0 if I∗ ≤ I∗
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p (1 − µ)βb if I∗











0 if I∗ ≤ I∗
2
1 if I∗










0 if I∗ ≤ I∗
2
(1 − µ)βb if I∗






Substitution of (40), (42) and (43) in (39) thus implies ∂Π

















′ (1 − ιg (I
∗))] + (1 − p)[R
′ (I
∗) − R
′ (1 − I
∗)]
−(1 − µ)βb, (44)
if I∗






. Note that (44) is weakly decreasing in I∗ and non-negative
for I∗ = 0.





































2 is implicitly deﬁned by (25).



















> W ≥ 1 − Ψb (0) −
p
2 (Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)), however, in which I∗
1 < 1











Proof of Proposition 2
As proof is almost identical to the proof of proposition 1, we only sketch it here
brieﬂy. The socially eﬃcient contractual foreign investment maximizes expected net
investment returns, which are given by
Π
eﬀ = p[R(1 − ιg (I
∗)) + R(ιg (I
∗))] + (1 − p)[R(1 − ιb (I
∗)) + R(ιb (I
∗))] − 1.






, we can again distinguish two cases.












holds true, it follows that
∂Πeﬀ




















> W ≥ 1 − Ψb (0) −
p








holds true, it follows that ∂Πeﬀ
∂I∗ = 0 if I∗ ≤ I∗
















′ (1 − ιg (I
∗))] + (1 − p)[R
′ (I
∗) − R










. Note that (11) implies ιg(I∗
2) = 1
2 so that it follows from
I∗
2 < 1




























, in which I∗
1 ≥ 1













2 is true since (11) and (17) implies that ιg(I∗) = 1


























> W ≥ 1 − Ψb (0) −
p
2 (Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)), however, in which I∗
1 < 1















and a comparison of (25) and (30) directly implies I∗
4 ≥ I∗
3 and thus I∗
eﬀ ≥ I∗
opt.
Furthermore, note that if 1 − p >
βb
βg−βb, it follows from (45) that ∂Πeﬀ





















If, however, 1 − p ≤
βb
βg−βb holds true, it follows that I∗
4 ≤ I∗
1 so that the socially






Proof of Proposition 4




















. For them, it follows from (26) and (27) that I∗
eﬀ
and thus ˜ k does not depend on PD.



















> W ≥ 1 −
Ψb (0)−
p
2 [Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)] when 1−p >
βb
βg−βb holds true. Then, it follows from (28)
that I∗
eﬀ = I∗
1, and from (23) that I∗
1 and thus ˜ k increases when PD decreases.




















1 − Ψb (0) −
p
2 [Ψg (0) − Ψb (0)] when 1 − p ≤
βb
βg−βb holds true and suppose that
p increases from p1 to p2. Then, the eﬃcient contractual foreign investment in-












































2 when p = p1 and I∗
eﬀ = 1
2 when p = p2.
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